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 SAFE SOCIAL SPACES 
ARI EZRA WALDMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
Technologies that mediate social interaction can put our privacy and our 
safety at risk. Harassment, intimate partner violence and surveillance, data 
insecurity, and revenge porn are just a few of the harms that bedevil 
technosocial spaces and their users, particularly users from marginalized 
communities. This Article seeks to identify the building blocks of safe social 
spaces, or environments in which individuals can share personal 
information at low risk of privacy threats. Relying on analogies to offline 
social spaces—Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, teams of coworkers, and 
attorney-client relationships—this Article argues that if a social space is 
defined as an environment characterized by disclosure, then a safe social 
space is one in which disclosure norms are counterbalanced by equally as 
powerful norms of trust that are both endogenously designed in and backed 
exogenously by law. Case studies of online social networks and social 
robots are used to show how both the design and law governing 
technosocial spaces today not only do not support trust, but actively 
undermine user safety by eroding trust and limiting the law’s regulatory 
power. The Article concludes with both design and law reform proposals to 
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Our social interactions are mediated by technology. We chat with 
friends, read the news, and buy things on technosocial1 platforms run by the 
likes of Facebook, Google, and Amazon. Alongside all of the benefits that 
kind of technology offers, it can also put our privacy and safety at risk. 
Scholars and media commentators have documented the rampant invasions 
 
1. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment 
Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 619 (2011) (coining the term “technosocial” 
to refer to the “intertwined effects of technological and social change”). This article uses “technosocial” 












of privacy,2 gender-based harassment,3 racism,4 cyberstalking,5 
nonconsensual pornography,6 and intimate surveillance7 on digital social 
platforms. Prominent women and members of other marginalized groups 
are leaving these spaces.8 That is not only regrettable; it is dangerous for 
democracy.9 Even as scholars start to pay more attention to platform content 
moderation policies that ostensibly try to create safe and welcoming 
environments online,10 things are not much better on the ground. This raises 
the question at the heart of this article: How can we make online social 
spaces safer?  
Social spaces, as I am using the phrase, are multi-actor information-
sharing environments.11 They can be physical (chatting with a friend at a 
coffee shop or running into an acquaintance and her dog at the corner of 
First and Main), digital (texting with someone on an online social network), 
 
2. See, e.g., Sam Wolfson, Amazon’s Alexa Recorded Private Conversation and Sent it to 
Random Contact, GUARDIAN (May 24, 2018, 6:09 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2018/may/24/amazon-alexa-recorded-conversation [https://perma.cc/NM8F-HUKB]; Issie Lapowsky, 
Facebook Exposed 87 Million Users to Cambridge Analytica, WIRED (Apr. 4, 2018, 5:43 PM), https:// 
www.wired.com/story/facebook-exposed-87-million-users-to-cambridge-analytica/ [https://perma.cc/K 
3VS-6BYB]. 
3. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014) (documenting a variety 
of forms of gender-based harassment and arguing for a civil rights agenda to combat them); Danielle 
Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009) [hereinafter Citron, Cyber Civil Rights] 
(arguing that gender-based harassment online is a civil rights violation). 
4. See, e.g., JESSE DANIELS, CYBER RACISM (2009); Brandon A. Robinson, “Personal 
Preference” as the New Racism: Gay Desire and Racial Cleansing in Cyberspace, 2 SOC. RACE & 
ETHNICITY 317 (2015). 
5. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Spying Inc., 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243, 1248–50 (2015) 
(exploring the federal and state criminal laws that punish and deter businesses trafficking in devices that 
are primarily useful for surreptitious interception of electronic communications). 
6. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Law, Privacy, and Online Dating: “Revenge Porn” in Gay Online 
Communities, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY, 2019, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-
core/content/view/BCCE05CF25AA4C2E05CCF8D64980E839/S0897654618000291a.pdf/law_privac
y_and_online_dating_revenge_porn_in_gay_online_communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3HB-BB7T] 
[hereinafter Waldman, Law, Privacy, and Online Dating] (documenting the phenomenon of revenge 
porn in gay male online communities). 
7. See, e.g., Diana Freed et al., Digital Technologies and Intimate Partner Violence: A 
Qualitative Analysis with Multiple Stakeholders, ACM ON HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION, 2017, 
http://www.nix dell.com/papers/digital-technologies-intimate.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ6U-K5VD]. 
8. See Catherine Piner, Feminist Writer Jessica Valenti Takes a Break from Social Media After 
Threat Against Her Daughter, SLATE (July 28, 2016, 5:01 PM), https://slate.com/human-
interest/2016/07/feminist-writer-jessica-valenti-takes-a-break-from-social-media-after-threat-against-
her-daughter.html [https://perma.cc/246F-A72E]. 
9. See Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combatting Gender Harassment, 108 
how tMICH. L. REV. 373, 391 (2009) [hereinafter Citron, Law’s Expressive Value] (discussing some of 
the broader harms of gender-based harassment and the silencing of women that it causes, including 
entrenching traditional hierarchies and eroding the ability of women to contribute to society, generally). 
10. See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online 
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018) (chronicling the development of content moderation policies at 
Facebook and arguing that they reflect First Amendment norms). 
11. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1–4 (1959) 
[hereinafter GOFFMAN, EVERYDAY LIFE]. 











or telephonic;12 they can be big (a party or a megachurch) or small (a one-
on-one meeting); they can involve the exchange of words (during a 
conversation over dinner) or body language (at a dance party or across the 
room at a tiresome meeting).13 Spaces become social when they are 
constructed by persons engaged in information exchange. 
As such, social spaces require us to navigate our privacy. Granted, 
privacy and sharing are creatures of context,14 and different social contexts 
function on different disclosures.15 But all social spaces operate with 
disclosure norms; that is, we all must share something.16 Because sharing 
information involves some risk—disclosure inherently makes one 
vulnerable to others—social spaces require risk minimization mechanisms 
if they are to survive. Otherwise, we could not continue to share secrets with 
our best friends, confide in loved ones, engage in commerce, or express 
ourselves freely.17 We would lose our sexual privacy,18 our opportunities for 
 
12. Although this understanding of social spaces is indebted to Goffman’s work on the 
interaction among persons in public places, Goffman’s research was focused exclusively on individuals 
in the “presence of others.” Id. at 1. Goffman even defines “interaction” to mean “face-to-face 
interaction,” as if there could be no other kind. Id. at 15. There is now a long literature applying 
Goffman’s concept of impression management to online social life. See, e.g., Liam Bullingham & Ana 
C. Vasconcelos, ‘The Presentation of Self in the Online World’: Goffman and the Study of Online 
Identities, 39 J. INFO. SCI. 101 (2013) (similar to offline, face-to-face interactions, internet users re-create 
their offline self online, but engage in image management and persona editing); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, 
Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 197–98 (2008) (selective exposure, 
critical to Goffman’s presentation of self, animates the different levels of privacy that some social 
networking sites provide); Jennifer L. Gibbs, Nicole B. Ellison & Rebecca D. Heino, Self-Presentation 
in Online Personals: The Role of Anticipated Future Interaction, Self-Disclosure, and Perceived Success 
in Internet Dating, 33 COMM. RES. 152 (2006) (examining conditional self-disclosure in the online 
dating context); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1427 (2000) (arguing that information privacy allows us to construct Goffman’s 
social facades). 
13. You can communicate quite a bit of information through body language. See, e.g., Lorenza 
Mondada, Challenges of Multimodality: Language and the Body in Social Interaction, 20 J. 
SOCIOLINGUISTICS 336, 340–41 (2016) (discussing the challenges of studying social interaction when 
language is only one modality); see also NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR AND COMMUNICATION (Aron W. 
Siegman & Stanley Feldstein eds., 2d ed. 2009). 
14. See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 137–38 (2010) (arguing that norms of appropriateness and information flow 
govern our expectations of privacy in different contexts). 
15. See Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies, 11 AM. J. SOC. 441, 
442–45, 463 (1906) (arguing that our relationships with different people differ because we share certain 
information with some and not with others); GOFFMAN, EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 11, at 107, 112 
(noting that forms of social interaction occur in the contexts appropriate for them, and what would be 
appropriate in one context might not be appropriate in another). 
16. See GOFFMAN, EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 11, at 64; see also GEORG SIMMEL, THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 315–16, 326–29 (Kurt H. Wolff ed. & trans., 1950); SISSELA BOK, 
SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 20, 23 (1982). 
17. See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 431, 452–56 (2016). 
18. See Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1874 (2019) [hereinafter 
Citron, Sexual Privacy] (sexual privacy involves “the social norms (behaviors, expectations, and 












solitude,19 and our freedom to develop and affirm our identities as we see 
fit.20 Creating environments where these freedoms exist is, I argue, the role 
of trust, design,21 and the law.22 If social spaces are defined by information 
exchange, safe social spaces are environments of information exchange in 
which disclosure norms are counterbalanced by norms of trust backed 
endogenously by design and exogenously by law.  
To suggest that the buildings blocks of safe social spaces are trust, 
design, and law, this article offers analogies.23 Part I explores trust and its 
effects on social behavior. Part II then shows how three paradigmatic safe 
social spaces—Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, corporate teams, 
and attorney-client relationships—are all endogenously designed to foster 
 
19. Solitude is an important value long coveted by privacy scholars. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, 
DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 576–79 (2003) [hereinafter Cohen, DRM and Privacy] 
(identifying intellectual privacy as an important value and noting its connection to privacy and solitude); 
Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008) (arguing that the ability to test out 
inchoate or unpopular ideas requires freedom from social surveillance); Samuel Warren & Louis D. 
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890) (“The intensity and complexity of life, 
attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, 
under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and 
privacy have become more essential to the individual.”). 
20. See IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL 
SPACE, TERRITORY, CROWDING 49–50 (1975) (“when the permeability of these boundaries [to the self] 
is under the control of a person a sense of individuality develops.”); see also Edward J. Bloustein, 
Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 973–74 
(1964) (arguing that one who is subject to privacy intrusions is “less of a man, [and] has less human 
dignity”). 
21. The word “design” can mean many different things, from intentions (something is done “by 
design”) to aesthetics (a room can be designed to be visually appealing). But for the purposes of this 
Article, I follow a broad definition from Don Norman, who wrote about design as a combination of 
affordances, constraints, and guideposts that direct behavior in useful ways. See DON NORMAN, THE 
DESIGN OF EVERYDAY THINGS 2, 9, 12–13 (1988). Sometimes, these are obvious: a wall in front of you 
redirects your path. Sometimes, these are subtler: spokes on street-level window sills discourage 
loitering. With respect to online spaces, I follow Woodrow Hartzog in his book, Privacy’s Blueprint, 
which defines design as the “processes that create consumer technologies and the results of their creative 
processes instantiated in hardware and software.” WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE 
BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 11 (2018) [hereinafter HARTZOG, 
PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT]. 
22. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) [hereinafter 
LESSIG, CODE] (noting that law, norms, markets, and technological architecture all govern conduct 
online). Trust is a norm. See Francis Fukuyama, Differing Disciplinary Perspectives on the Origins of 
Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 479, 480–81 (2001) [hereinafter Fukuyama, Differing Disciplinary Perspectives]. 
Design is architecture. See HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 21, at 11. 
23. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Premises and Conclusions: Symbolic Logic for Legal Analysis: 
The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 517 (1998); Scott Brewer, Exemplary 
Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 923, 937 (1996); Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353 (1996); James R. 
Murray, The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 833 (1982); Frederic 
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993). There are, of course, other relationships that offer informative analogies, 
including, in particular, the social relationship established between investigative reporters and their 
sources. The three discussed in this article are emblematic of safe social spaces. 











the kind of trust, confidentiality, and discretion needed to facilitate 
disclosure.24 And because society benefits from disclosures in each of these 
contexts,25 the law exogenously supports designed-in norms of trust to 
ensure those spaces are safe for sharing personal, secret, or stigmatizing 
information.  
Technosocial spaces, however, lack both endogenous and exogenous 
structures that support trust. Far from it. As I discuss in Part III, these spaces 
are actually designed to manipulate us and lull us into false senses of 
familiarity and confidence, thereby enticing risky disclosure. And they do 
so in a legal and regulatory void that leaves users unprotected and 
vulnerable to invasions of privacy and online harassment.  
But it doesn’t have to be that way. Technosocial spaces can learn from 
safe social spaces offline and reorient design and law to foster trust. Robust 
approaches to privacy- and safety-by-design can protect users from the 
inside,26 and stronger legal responses to manipulative design and online 
harassment can restore trust when something goes wrong. These proposals 
are outlined in Part IV. 
 
24. See ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN 
INFORMATION AGE 54–60 (2018) [hereinafter WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST] (showing that trust 
among social actors is essential for sharing personal information). 
25. For some examples of the scholarly literature on the benefits of sharing and disclosure in 
addiction recovery, please see, e.g., Irwin Altman, Reciprocity of Interpersonal Exchange, 3 J. THEORY 
SOC. BEHAVIOUR 249 (1973); Kathryn P. Davison, James W. Pennebaker & Sally W. Dickerson, Who 
Talks? The Social Psychologist of Illness Support Groups, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 205 (2000); Dalmas 
A. Taylor, The Development of Interpersonal Relationships: Social Penetration Processes, 75 J. SOC. 
PSYCH. 79 (1968). For the value generated by free sharing among corporate teams, please see, e.g., Amy 
C. Edmondson, The Local and Variegated Nature of Learning in Organizations: A Group-Level 
Perspective, in SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURES AND RELATIONSHIPS 631 (Mary 
Goodwyn & Jody Hoffer Gittel eds., 2012) [hereinafter Edmondson, Learning in Organizations] 
(discussing how teams of coworkers work together and share information to enhance organizational 
learning); Morten T. Hansen, The Search-Transfer Problem: The Role of Weak Ties in Sharing 
Knowledge Across Organization Subunits, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 82, 105 (1999) (showing that complex 
information is difficult to transmit between corporate department teams); David Lazer & Allan 
Friedman, The Network Structure of Exploration and Exploitation, 52 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 667 (2007) 
(considering how network structure affects communication among teams and, ultimately, system 
performance). And to understand the benefits to society from the free flow of information between 
clients and attorneys, please see, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“sound 
legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and . . . depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by 
the client”); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (“the advocate and counselor . . . [must] 
know all that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be 
carried out.”); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (assistance of counsel “can only be safely 
and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure”); see also 
Geoffrey Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 
1061 (1978) (noting that the privilege allows an attorney to prepare a case and effectively advocate). 
26. Privacy by design is the notion that privacy should be part of the development process of 
new technologies rather than tacked on at the end. For two comprehensive approaches to defining 
privacy by design, please see HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 21; see also Ari Ezra 
Waldman, Privacy’s Law of Design, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1239 (2019) [hereinafter Waldman, 












There is no perfectly safe space, digital or otherwise. Even better design, 
comprehensive federal and state laws, and private ordering cannot account 
for all human mischief. But in a modern world in which sharing is, if not 
always mandatory, expected, law and design can make social spaces safer 
by supporting and protecting trust and repairing it when it breaks down. 
I. TRUST AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 
Although scholars bring different modalities to the study of trust, there 
is remarkable overlap in the way different fields conceptualize the concept. 
That literature has been discussed in depth elsewhere.27 A chief take away 
from that scholarship is that trust is an essential element of online social 
governance. Joel Reidenberg28 and Lawrence Lessig29 predicted this when 
they argued that law, architecture, markets, and norms work together to 
regulate online conduct. Trust is one of those norms and, therefore, an 
important focal point for the study of technosocial spaces.  
A. What is Trust? 
Robert Putnam and Francis Fukuyama think about trust as 
epiphenomenal with social capital. For Putnam, social capital is a “feature 
of social organizations . . . that facilitates coordination and cooperation for 
mutual benefit.”30 Fukuyama goes a step further, arguing that social capital 
consists of norms or values, “instantiated in an actual relationship among 
two or more people, that promote cooperation between them.”31 On a micro 
level, social capital constitutes the advantages and benefits that individuals 
realize owing to their connections with others, like coworkers learning from 
one another and cooperating to achieve a goal32 or social groups from 
diverse backgrounds whose experiences are enhanced because of their 
diversity.33 Social capital also develops on a more macro level, among 
 
27. See WALDMAN. PRIVACY AS TRUST, supra note 24, at 51–60; see also Richards & Hartzog, 
supra note 17. 
28. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules 
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (1998) (“The creation and implementation of 
information policy are embedded in network designs and standards as well as in system 
configurations.”). 
29. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, VERSION 2.0 (2006). 
30. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 
65, 67 (1995); see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000).  
31. Fukuyama, Differing Disciplinary Perspectives, supra note 22, at 480. 
32. See, e.g., Michael Useem & Jerome Karabel, Pathways to Top Corporate Management, 51 
AM. SOC. REV. 184 (1986). 
33. See, e.g., Ronald S. Burt, The Contingent Value of Social Capital, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 339 
(1997). 











individuals in larger communities and nations and even among nations and 
peoples.34 In all cases, social capital refers to the good things that develop 
out of our connections to others. 
Trust is one of those good things. Trust is a resource of social capital 
concerning the expectations that others will behave according to accepted 
norms.35 It is the “favorable expectation regarding other people’s actions 
and intentions,”36 or the belief that others will behave in a predictable 
manner. For example, if I ask a friend to hold my spare set of keys, I trust 
she will not break in and steal from me. When an individual speaks with 
relative strangers in a support group like AA, she trusts that they will not 
divulge her secrets.37 Trust, therefore, includes a willingness to accept some 
risk and vulnerability toward others and steps in to grease the wheels of 
social activity in the absence of perfect knowledge: I cannot know for 
certain that my neighbor will not abuse her key privileges or that my fellow 
support group members will keep my confidences. As Niklas Luhmann has 
stated, trust begins where knowledge ends.38 As such, trust allows me to 
interact with and rely on others. 
Trust is essential online. Nearly two decades ago, Helen Nissenbaum 
presciently noted that trust is “key to the promise the online world holds for 
great and diverse benefits to humanity,” including richer communities, 
engaged politics, and robust commerce, because “[p]eople shy away from 
territories they distrust.”39 That is just as true today. Corporate executives 
talk about ensuring a steady stream of customer data by gaining user trust 
and confidence.40 Apple asks us if we “Trust this browser?” when we log in 
to iCloud on a new device. In 2013, Facebook conducted a study of its users 
to determine “how trustworthy” they think Facebook is overall.41 The 
 
34. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 
(1995). 
35. See Alejandro Portes & Julia Sensenbrenner, Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the 
Social Determinants of Economic Action, 98 AM. J. SOC. 1320, 1332 (1993). 
36. Guido Möllering, The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expectation, 
Interpretation and Suspension, 35 SOC. 403, 404 (2001); see also Ken Newton & Sonja Zmerli, Three 
Forms of Trust and Their Association, 3 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 169, 171 (2011); J. David Lewis & Andrew 
Weigert, Trust as Social Reality, 63 SOCIAL FORCES 967, 968 (1985).  
37. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, UNDERSTANDING ANONYMITY (2018), https://www.aa.org/ 
pages/en_US/understanding-anonymity [https://perma.cc/8A8D-HLG3] [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING 
ANONYMITY]. 
38. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER 5 (Howard Davies, John Raffan & Kathryn 
Rooney trans., Tom Burns & Gianfranco Poggi eds., 2017) (1979). 
39. Helen Nissenbaum, Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or Oxymoron, 81 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636 
(2001). 
40. See Timothy Morey et al., Customer Data: Designing for Transparency and Trust, HARV. 
BUS. REV., May 2015, at 96. 
41. See Brian Fung, Facebook Wants to Know If Your Trust It. But It’s Keeping All the Answers 












Federal Trade Commission (FTC)42 and the California Attorney General’s 
Office43 couch their recommendations for transparency in corporate data use 
as a way of inspiring consumer trust. And the work of scholars like Kirsten 
Martin shows that failing to meet the privacy expectations of users 
negatively impacts the trust those users have in the website and reduces user 
willingness to share.44 
B. How Does Trust Develop? 
Trust, like other norms of social life, can develop hierarchically from 
above. For example, legal rules can influence norms of behavior through 
the law’s expressive power,45 as when the Supreme Court declares race-
based discrimination illegal and, over time, the illegality of discrimination 
is accepted as a moral imperative.46 Fiduciary laws, medical malpractice 
law, and legally enforced canons of ethics are just three of the myriad rules 
and private ordering schemes that support trust norms from above.  
Norms can also be influenced by design, as when a builder puts spikes 
on first floor window sills to prevent loitering and thereby influences 




42. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH 
TRANSPARENCY 3–4 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-privacy-
disclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-federal-trade-commission-staff-report/130201mobilep 
rivacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/43PA-83CU]; see also Protecting Mobile Privacy: Your 
Smartphones, Tablets, Cell Phones and Your Privacy, Hearing Before the Subcomm. for Privacy, Tech. 
& the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 90 (2011) (statement of Alan Davidson, 
Director of Public Policy, Google, Inc.). 
43. See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MAKING YOUR PRIVACY PRACTICES PUBLIC: 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEVELOPING A MEANINGFUL PRIVACY POLICY 4 (2014), https://oag.ca.gov/sit 
es/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cybersecurity/making_your_privacy_practices_public.pdf [https://perma.cc/2L 
NN-KRHQ]. 
44. See Kirsten Martin, Understanding Privacy Online: Development of a Social Contract 
Approach to Privacy, 137 J. BUS. ETHICS 551 (2016). 
45. See, e.g., Citron, Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 9, at 407; Deborah Hellman, The 
Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 n.10 (2000) (law is coercive and 
expressive of norms); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard M. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1570–71 (2000) (what the law is establishes a set of 
agreed upon values). 
46. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2043 
(1996); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 158 (1999). This is not to say that norm generation through law’s expressive power is perfect. 
Discrimination, white supremacy, and other odious forms of bigotry are still far too common today. 
Court decisions haven’t changed that. See BRIAN LEVIN & JOHN DAVID REITZEL, CTR. FOR THE STUDY 
OF HATE & EXTREMISM, REPORT TO THE NATION: HATE CRIMES RISE IN U.S. CITIES AND COUNTIES IN 
TIME OF DIVISION & FOREIGN INTERFERENCE 3–4 (2018), https://csbs.csusb.edu/sites/csusb_csbs/files/ 
2018%20Hate%20Final%20Report%205-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFM5-M6BL].  
47. See UNPLEASANT DESIGN (Gordan Savicic & Selena Savic eds., 2013) (collecting and 
analyzing myriad common examples of how the design of mostly public spaces can deter antisocial 











When technologies mediate social interaction, code plays this role, 
mandating or guiding norms of behavior online, 48 as when platforms 
automatically screen out content from sites like InfoWars or Gateway 
Pundit in an attempt to algorithmically combat conspiracy theories and fake 
news,49 or when digital rights management prohibits reproduction of 
copyrighted material.50 
Norms of trust can also emerge from below, through experience or 
explicit or implicit social cues. Experience gives us more data from which 
to judge the trustworthiness of others; keeping a friend’s confidences for ten 
years gives them a stronger basis for trust than a single day. Explicit (“this 
is between us”) and implicit cues (physically turning away from a crowd, 
huddling down, whispering) can also generate expectations of trust.51 As 
can reciprocity, which establishes mutual vulnerability52 and helps generate 
mutual feelings of cooperation and altruism.53 Cues also allow us to trust 
strangers. For example, two people who share a stigmatizing social identity 
often create an instant bond of trust based on a shared set of narratives and 
experiences.54 We are more willing to interact with others the more 
embedded they are in a familiar social network.55 We tend to trust experts 
and professionals based on their degrees, transferring the trust we have in a 
school’s reputation, which we know, to one of its graduates, whom we do 
 
behavior, from uncomfortable benches and window sill spikes that discourage people from sitting or 
lying down to unflattering light that deters everything from congregation to intravenous drug use). 
48. See LESSIG, CODE, supra note 22. 
49. See, e.g., Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Fake Election News Stories 
Outperformed Reals News on Facebook, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016, 4:15 PM), https://www.buzzf 
eed.com/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook [https://perma. 
cc/M7DS-NA4S]. 
50. See Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 223–24 (2007) 
(“The Internet of digital rights management, take-down notices, and content filtering is a colony, in 
which permissible interactions are rigidly structured in the interest of an assertedly greater social 
good.”); see also Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 19, at 580–86 (describing how DRM are 
designed to constrain user behavior). 
51. See ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES 173 (1963) (noting how conversations 
in public closed to others may sometimes involve “huddling” down to keep confidences). 
52. See, e.g., Nancy R. Buchan, Rachel T.A. Croson & Robyn M. Dawes, Swift Neighbors and 
Persistent Strangers: A Cross-Cultural Investigation of Trust and Reciprocity in Social Exchange, 108 
AM. J. SOC. 168, 170 (2002) (recognizing the vulnerability that emerges out of sharing information with 
others). 
53. See Fukuyama, Differing Disciplinary Perspectives, supra note 22, at 491–93; see also 
WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST, supra note 24, at 53. 
54. See Michele Williams, In Whom We Trust: Group Membership as an Affective Context for 
Trust Development, 26 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 377, 381–82, 385 (2001) (providing survey and 
experimental evidence of the power of associational membership to influence trust in others). 
55. See, e.g., Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 












not.56 And we often choose doctors based on recommendations from friends 
or colleagues.57  
These mechanisms of trust generation operate online, as well. On dating 
apps, for example, users protect themselves by ensuring reciprocal sharing 
of personal information and images.58 They listen to cues through extended 
text messaging.59 Queer users tend to trust other queer users online because 
of a sense of shared struggle.60 And we are willing to share more information 
on platforms like Facebook when we see more of our friends and intimates 
sharing, as well.61 As James Grimmelmann has noted, all of our trusted 
friends “can’t be wrong” that Facebook, or any other platform, is a safe 
place to interact.62 Together, these endogenous forces foster organic trust 
and allow social interaction to occur. 
II. SAFE SOCIAL SPACES 
But trust cannot operate alone. Design and law must work together to 
buttress trust norms and ensure safe and socially beneficial disclosures. And 
we see it work all the time: AA meetings, corporate teams, and attorneys 
and their clients are just three examples. This Part describes trust-enhancing 
design and law in each.   
Participants in AA meetings need to share information without fear that 
their condition, which unfortunately remains stigmatized,63 will be 
publicized. Therefore, meetings are designed with mutually enforced strict 
confidentiality rules and operating structures that engender norms of trust. 
Privacy torts are also available in case something goes wrong.64 Similarly, 
 
56. See Patricia M. Doney et al., Understanding the Influence of National Culture on the 
Development of Trust, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 601, 607 (1998) (discussing the role of transference of 
trust). 
57. See Roni Caryn Rabin, You Can Find Dr. Right, with Some Effort, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 
2008), www.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/health/30find.html [https://perma.cc/7H8N-9FSC]. 
58. See Waldman, Law, Privacy, and Online Dating, supra note 6. 
59. See id. 
60. See id. 
61. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust: The Facebook Study, 67 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 193 (2016) [hereinafter Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust]; see also Alessandro Acquisti, 
Leslie K. John & George Loewenstein, The Impact of Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose, 
49 J. MARKETING RES. 160, 162 (2012) (“[W]hen people are surrounded by others who are revealing 
intimate details about their lives, they may conform to the prevailing norm of divulgence.”). 
62. James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1161 (2009). 
63. See, e.g., Georg Schomerus et al., The Stigma of Alcohol Dependence Compared with Other 
Mental Disorders: A Review of Population Studies, 46 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 105 (2011) (showing 
that alcohol-dependent persons tend to be viewed as far more responsible for their actions and provoke 
more social rejection and negative emotions from others than those living with substance-unrelated 
mental disorders); see also Robin Room, Stigma, Social Inequality and Alcohol and Drug Use, 24 DRUG 
& ALCOHOL REV. 143 (2005) (significant stigma associated with alcohol and drug abuse contributes to 
exclusion of those most in need of social support). 
64. See infra Part II.A. 











corporate teams working toward productivity goals must share ideas and 
learn from each other without having to worry that one member is going to 
decamp to a competitor (or a competing team within a company) with inside 
information. To mitigate that risk, workers deploy informal tactics to 
determine trust in team members on the ground, employers write in non-
compete clauses into contracts, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA) and the law of trade secrets limit what workers can take with them 
when they switch jobs.65 Finally, individuals seeking counsel must be able 
to share details of their cases in order to obtain effective representation. 
Therefore, they rely on heuristics and personal recommendations to find 
lawyers they trust. And they do so in a context in which the legal profession 
itself has set up powerful ethical guidelines that carry punishments for 
noncompliance and in which malpractice law protects victims from 
negligent attorneys.66 In all three of these case studies, endogenous design 
and exogenous law reinforce trust norms among social actors, keeping the 
contexts safe for intimate disclosures. 
A. Alcoholics and Narcotics Anonymous 
Disclosure is written into the DNA of AA. Individuals attend meetings 
to “share their experience, strength and hope with each other” in order to 
recover.67 Meetings function with both narrative and discussion, where 
members introduce themselves and share stories about how alcohol has 
impacted their lives. After the narrative, other members may add their own 
perspective, share similar or related stories, or make suggestions on how to 
deal with an impulse to drink. Discussion ensues, or the meeting turns to 
other members who volunteer to introduce themselves as alcoholics and 
share their stories.68 All AA members engage in “[m]eeting and talking and 
 
65. See infra Part II.B. 
66. See infra Part II.C. 
67. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, THIS IS A.A.: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE A.A. RECOVERY 
PROBLEM 2 (2017) https://www.aa.org/assets/en_US/p-1_thisisaa1.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2XR-MTK 
T] [hereinafter THIS IS A.A.] It should be noted here that neither AA nor Narcotics Anonymous (NA) 
are perfect organizations. Its effectiveness is up for debate, and many criticize its inclusion of “god” in 
its literature and twelve steps. Given that anyone can attend a meeting as long as they admit their lack 
of control over alcohol consumption, AA can also be dangerous. See, e.g., LANCE DODES & ZACHARY 
DODES, THE SOBER TRUTH: DEBUNKING THE BAD SCIENCE BEHIND 12-STEP PROGRAMS AND THE 
REHAB INDUSTRY (2014) (finding AA’s success rate at just five to eight percent of people); Twelve Steps 
to Dangers: How Alcoholics Anonymous Can Be a Playground for Violence-Prone Members, 
PROPUBLICA (Nov. 29, 2014, 7:10 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-alcoholics-
anonymous-can-be-a-playground-for-violence [https://perma.cc/Q8MG-W2PE]. I take no position on 
the effectiveness of AA. The purpose of briefly profiling AA here is to show that it is a social space, 
with powerful disclosure norms that are backed by norms of trust. 
68. See, e.g., E.J. Khantzian & John E. Mack, How AA Works and Why It’s Important for 
Clinicians to Understand, 11 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 77, 86–87 (1995) (discussing the 












helping other”69 participants because only through sharing stories can 
members “observe[] and follow[] the successful experience[s]” of those 
who are sober.70  
The long scholarly literature on AA71 shows that disclosure is essential. 
Disclosure transforms participants into their own therapists.72 It reinforces 
self-identification as having a substance abuse problem, a threshold step to 
recovery. And testifying about experiences brings new members into the 
fold by giving them models to follow and proving that they are not alone.73  
Trust is what allows AA members to meet their disclosure obligations in 
safety. Trust organically develops in each AA meeting because all 
participants start by knowing exactly one thing about each other: they all 
share a stigmatizing identity. Familiarity has long been understood by social 
scientists as a basis for trust among persons. Max Weber thought that shared 
Protestantism allowed people who did not really know each other to trust 
that they would be competent contractual partners.74 It signaled their 
common values. Sharing an out-group identity signals a common narrative 
and common struggle, as well, both of which influence values.75 Everyone 
in AA shares a common and difficult relationship with alcohol. They 
 
69. THIS IS A.A., supra note 67, at 8. 
70. Id. at 13. 
71. The literature on AA is largely about its effectiveness and, therefore, far beyond the scope of 
this Article. See, e.g., Lee Ann Kaskutas, Alcoholics Anonymous Effectiveness: Faith Meets Science, 28 
J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 135 (2009) (reviewing the literature on AA effectiveness); Henry A. 
Montgomery, William R. Miller & Scott Tonigan, Does Alcoholics Anonymous Involvement Predict 
Treatment Outcome, 12 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 241, 245 (1995) (showing that attending AA 
meetings did not have a statistically significant effect on sobriety after inpatient treatment compared to 
non-attenders); Rudolf H. Moos & Bernice S. Moos, Participation in Treatment and Alcoholics 
Anonymous: A 16-Year Follow-Up of Initially Untreated Individuals, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 735, 745–
46 (2006) (finding that individuals who participated in AA for twenty-seven weeks or more had better 
sixteen-year alcohol-related outcomes than those who did not participate in any AA meetings).  
72. See Frank Reissman, The ‘Helper’ Therapy Principle, 10 SOC. WORK 27, 27–28 (1965) 
(noting that sharing one’s story can provide both help to others and personal benefit). 
73. Although there is fierce debate over the effectiveness of self-help programs, there is 
considerably less disagreement in the clinical psychology literature about the self-help benefits of self-
disclosure, narrative, and testimony, whether in a clinician’s office or elsewhere. See, e.g., JOHN 
MCLEOD, NARRATIVE AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (1997); see also James W. Pennebaker & Janel D. Seagal, 
Forming a Story: The Health Benefits of Narrative, 55 J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 1243, 1243–44 (1999) (the 
act of writing down a personal narrative can contribute to positive mental health benefits); JoAnne 
Banks-Wallace, Emancipatory Potential of Storytelling in a Group, 30 J. NURSING SCHOLAR. 17, 17–
18 (1998) (discussing the importance of narrative storytelling in advancing the mental health of African 
women).  
74. See MAX WEBER, The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism, in FROM MAX WEBER: 
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 302, 312 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946). 
75. See Martin Tanis & Tom Postmes, A Social Identity Approach to Trust: Interpersonal 
Perception, Group Membership and Trusting Behaviour, 35 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 413 (2005) (finding 
that when individuals are not identifiable, trusting behavior is based on expectations of reciprocity 
inferred from group membership); Williams, supra note 54, at 381, 385 (discussing how “[p]eople tend 
to associate positive beliefs and feelings with the groups to which they belong”). 











reciprocally share their stories, building the kind of mutual vulnerability that 
generates trust. As a result, when AA members notice an acquaintance at a 
meeting, AA advises them not to worry: AA expects that members will 
“respect your privacy.”76 AA literature also notes that “experience suggests 
that AA members . . . are vigilant” about protecting confidentiality, only use 
first names, and maintain personal anonymity in the media.77 Members 
behave like this on their own because of the common struggle they share. 
These organic norms of trust are supported by design. AA designs in trust 
by creating rules of confidentiality. Anonymity is the “spiritual foundation” 
of AA.78 According to AA’s founder, appropriately only known as Bill W., 
anonymity provides “protection for the newcomer, respect and support of 
the outside world, and security from those of us who would use A.A. for 
sick and selfish purposes.”79 The knowledge commons of AA are, therefore, 
governed by rules, guidelines, and suggestions that buttress the already 
strong confidentiality norms that develop immediately at AA meetings.80 
And the confidentiality of AA meetings can also be buttressed by law. 
Although cases here are few and far between for obvious reasons—namely, 
filing suit for being exposed by another as a member of AA requires going 
public about the plaintiff’s membership81—a few courts have supported the 
privacy expectations of AA members based on the norms of trust inherent 
in AA itself. In State v. Ashworth,82 for example, police officers 
investigating a report of gun shots interrupted an AA meeting, pulled 
Ashworth outside, and conducted several field sobriety tests that put his 
blood-alcohol content above the legal limit.83 Because the police lacked a 
warrant, Ashworth moved to suppress evidence of the alcohol concentration 
in his blood.84 The trial court stated that Ashworth’s expectation of privacy 
 
76. See UNDERSTANDING ANONYMITY, supra note 37, at 8. 
77. Id. at 12. 
78. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, A.A. GUIDELINES (2017), https://www.aa.org/assets/en_US/ 
mg-18_internet.pdf [https://perma.cc/TF45-NTPM] [hereinafter A.A. GUIDELINES]; Anonymity is the 
Spiritual Foundation, NA WAY MAG., July 2002, at 6, https://www.na.org/admin/include/spaw2/uploa 
ds/pdf/naway/en/usnaway_jul2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5RJ-KNQJ]. 
79. A.A. GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at 1. 
80. The term “knowledge commons” refers to information that is a shared resource. That the 
people in a given AA meeting are all alcoholics is an example of a piece of knowledge in common to 
everyone at that meeting. See GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS (Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Michael J. Madison & Brett Frischmann eds., 2014).  
81. It is, of course, possible to plead pseudonymously or anonymously in litigation. See, e.g., 
Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When Should Litigants be Permitted to Keep Their 
Identities Confidential?, 37 HASTING L.J. 1 (1985) (providing an analytical scheme for determining 
when pseudonymity in litigation should be allowed). 
82. 228 P.3d 381 (Idaho 2010). 
83. Id. at 382. 
84. Id. at 382. Because Ashworth had a previous DUI conviction, his alcohol concentration of 












rested on “his and society’s understanding of the privacy afforded by 
attendance at an AA meeting.” The court explained: 
Certainly, if a group member admitted during a meeting that he had 
driven to the meeting while drunk, neither society nor members 
would consider that information public currency. The nature of 
Alcoholics Anonymous conveys an objective understanding of a 
group that protects the anonymity of its members. Information 
imparted to the group in a meeting where the privacy of those 
attending is expected is intended to be held in confidence by other 
members.85 
The Idaho trial court in Ashworth was willing to stand behind and support 
that built-in trust norm.86 
The Ashworth court is not alone in using the law to support the trust and 
confidentiality norms of AA meetings. In Harford v. City of Santa Clarita,87 
a town resident and nonsmoker petitioned the court to order the township 
police to enforce a municipal no-smoking ordinance outside a meeting place 
of the Rafters Group, the local chapter of AA.88 The ordinance made 
smoking illegal in public places, but exempted so-called “private clubs” and 
gave city officials discretion to interpret and apply the law.89 The Rafters 
argued that it fell within the exemption. After several notifications of 
smoking in violation of the ordinance, city officials declined to enforce the 
law, arguing that AA fell under the private club exception.90 The appellate 
court agreed, noting that it was entirely reasonable for city officials to 
consider the privacy normally afforded to AA meetings to determine that it 
was a private club entitled to conduct its meetings pursuant to privacy and 
association rights guaranteed by the California Constitution.91 
In the United Kingdom, where the law of confidence is far more 
developed than in the United States,92 the law protects the trust that 
organically develops inside support groups. In one famous example, the 
 
85. Id. at 385. 
86. This motion to suppress was ultimately rejected by the intermediate appellate court, but not 
because it found the trial court wrong in its use of law to support AA’s trust norms. Rather, it was a 
problem of evidence. Ashworth had not bothered to prove at trial that he had both a subjective and 
objective expectation of privacy in the AA meeting. The court, therefore, reversed the grant of the motion 
to suppress based on clear precedent requiring a high evidentiary showing from similar petitioners. Id. 
at 385–86. 
87. No. B144255, 2002 WL 27113 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2002). 
88. Id. at *1. 
89. Id. at *5. 
90. Id. at *1. 
91. Id. at *5–11. 
92. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 145–73 (2007). 











supermodel Naomi Campbell sued the British tabloid, The Mirror, after it 
published a photograph of her leaving a Narcotics Anonymous (NA) 
meeting.93 Although she admitted the public may have an interest in news 
about her, Ms. Campbell nevertheless argued that publishing the picture was 
an invasion of the privacy that she should expect as a member of NA.94 The 
House of Lords agreed. Lord Hope wrote that “the details of Miss 
Campbell’s attendance at Narcotics Anonymous [were] private information 
which imported a duty of confidence.”95 Lady Hale, also in the majority, 
called both the fact of NA attendance and any information disclosed in NA 
meetings “obviously private” and “both private and confidential, because it 
related to an important aspect of Miss Campbell’s physical and mental 
health.”96 To hold otherwise would risk Ms. Campbell’s and others’ mental 
health by discouraging future attendance at NA or AA meetings.97 Although 
the relative weakness of the tort of breach of confidentiality98 and the 
enormous newsworthiness exception to the tort of public disclosure of 
private facts99 would make Ms. Campbell’s case more difficult in the United 
States, it is clear that law can and has supported the organic and privately 
ordered trust norms that make programs like AA and NA work. 
B. Teams of Coworkers 
The information exchanged among coworkers may be different than the 
kind of information shared among AA members. But information sharing is 
no less essential to achieving the team’s socially beneficial productivity 
goals. Teams are, after all, the fundamental work unit of most 
 
93. Campbell v. MGN Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 (Eng.). 
94. Id. at [2]. There was some disagreement among the Lords about the proper claim for the case. 
Suffice it to say, regardless of which tort was operative in this case, the House of Lords was willing to 
recognize that British common law can recognize and support the confidentiality norms embedded in 
AA as legitimate expectations of privacy. 
95. Id. at [95]. 
96. Id. at [147]. 
97. Id. at [155]. 
98. But see Ari Ezra Waldman, A Breach of Trust: Fighting “Revenge Porn”, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
709, 722–28 (2016) (arguing that there no doctrinal barriers to the expansion of the breach of 
confidentiality tort in the United States). 
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D. The newsworthiness exception has been 
broadly interpreted, making it difficult for both well-known and even private individuals to recover 
under the tort of public disclosure. See, e.g., Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (“[T]he First Amendment greatly circumscribes the right even of a private figure to obtain 
damages for the publication of newsworthy facts about him, even when they are facts of a kind that 
people want very much to conceal.”); Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 













organizations.100 Teams of coworkers make hiring decisions in midsized 
and large organizations; engineers work together to build technology 
products; juries decide guilt. Scholars have found increased knowledge 
transfer within and among teams in organizations correlate with complex 
problem solving,101 better productivity and performance,102 and 
organizational learning,103 or company-wide adaptions to new realities.104 
These benefits are based on the capacity of discussion and sharing to 
increase the pool of available knowledge, allowing teams to make 
theoretically better, more accurate, and more reflective decisions.105 
Norms of disclosure are, therefore, built into teams. Discussion is the 
bread and butter of team function, with discussion structures varying 
widely.106 Team members are expected to share stories and insights during 
work,107 provide feedback,108 and discuss together how best to solve 
complex problems.109 One study of software and hardware design teams 
showed that information sharing is an essential part of the design process. 
Design teams, which are usually constituted by individuals or subgroups 
working on specific parts of the larger product, often hold weekly meetings 
 
100. See PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE: THE ART & PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING 
ORGANIZATION (2006); Paul Osterman, How Common is Workplace Transformation and Who Adopts 
It?, 47 INDUS. LAB. RELATIONS REV. 172 (1994). 
101. See, e.g., Lazer & Friedman, supra note 25, at 668–69. 
102. See, e.g., Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus & Leslie A. DeChurch, Information Sharing and Team 
Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 535 (2009) (reviewing 72 independent studies, 
covering 4,795 total groups with 17,279 persons, and finding that information sharing positively 
predicted team performance across all levels); Morten T. Hansen, Knowledge Networks: Explaining 
Effective Knowledge Sharing in Multiunit Companies, 13 ORG. SCI. 232 (2002) (finding that increased 
knowledge sharing among company units contributed to faster completion of projects). 
103. See, e.g., Edmondson, Learning in Organizations, supra note 25, at 633–37 (linking team 
learning to organizational learning and adaptation). 
104. Id. at 631 (defining organizational learning as “a process of improving organizational actions 
through better knowledge and understanding”). 
105. Notably, this does not always work. In a famous study conducted by the psychologists Garold 
Stasser and William Titus in 1985, the researchers showed that group discussion is often biased toward 
already shared or commonly known information, rather than the new information from which teams 
could benefit. Stasser and Titus found, then, that a team can confirm previously held views rather than 
open team members to new ideas. See Garold Stasser & William Titus, Pooling of Unshared Information 
in Group Decision Making: Biased Information Sampling During Discussion, 48 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCH. 1467, 1467–68 (1985). The balance of research still suggests that knowledge and 
information sharing in teams can be successful and is positively correlated with various positive social 
outcomes. See Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, supra note 102, at 535–41 (reviewing the literature after 
1985). 
106. See Gwen M. Wittenbaum & Jonathan M. Bowman, A Social Validation Explanation for 
Mutual Enhancement, 40 J. EXPER. SOC. PSYCH. 169 (2004) (discussing how different models of 
discussion, including the role of positive feedback, affect information gathering in teams). 
107. See John Seely Brown & Paul Duquid, Organizational Learning and Communities-of-
Practice: Toward a Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation, 2 ORG. SCI. 40, 40–41 (1991). 
108. See Teresa K. Lant, Aspiration Level Adaptation: An Empirical Exploration, 38 MGMT. SCI. 
623, 624 (1992) (finding that teams respond to performance feedback). 
109. See Lazer & Friedman, supra note 25, at 668–69. 











where they learn about each other’s progress. Both leaders and team 
members expect that everyone will share their work, new information that 
impacts the team’s responsibilities, and questions that have come up during 
design.110 And questions always come up; new information, whether from 
other teams, suppliers, managers, mentors, or scholars, is always needed to 
complete the design phase.111 Therefore, team members work together to 
identify the best sources of information, collaborate with others in the 
company, and conduct outside research. Primarily, though, team members 
talk to each other: diverse team members often have answers or 
recommendations on where to turn. Serendipitous encounters outside 
offices or in hallways also help share information, and project managers are 
usually expected to mediate and find connections that help fill information 
gaps.112  
Just like sharing in AA meetings is necessary for recovery, sharing in 
teams is necessary for productivity. And norms of trust are essential to 
sustain both types of sharing. Trust gives coworkers the comfort and safety 
to share ideas freely,113 to reflect on performance,114 and to suggest new 
ways of doing business without fear of opportunistic behavior from would-
be competitors.115 
Also like AA, where trust organically exists in testimonial meetings 
because each member shares a stigmatizing social identity,116 some level of 
trust exists organically in corporate teams by virtue of their shared 
membership in the organization and shared goal of production. The 
management scholars Wenpin Tsai and Sumantra Ghoshal called this 
phenomenon the result of a “shared vision” that helps a team or network 
direct their efforts.117 Having a shared vision, common membership, and 
identical goals bonds teammates together, creating a foundation of trust.118 
Trust also organically develops within teams that exhibit stable membership 
over time. Learning depends, at least in some part, on memories of 
individuals: a team member can only advise against repeating mistakes if 
 
110. See Steven Poltrock et al., Information Seeking and Sharing in Design Teams, 2003 INT. 
ACM SIGGROUP CONF. ON SUPPORTING GRP. WORK 239, 240–41. 
111. Id. at 242. 
112. Id. at 244.  
113. Amy Edmondson, Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior in Work Teams, 44 ADMIN. 
SCI. Q. 350, 350 (1999) [hereinafter Edmondson, Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior]. 
114. See Edmondson, Learning in Organizations supra note 25, at 633–34. 
115. See, e.g., Andrew C. Inkpen & Eric W. K. Tsang, Social Capital, Networks, and Knowledge 
Transfer, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 146, 154 (2005); J. Carlos Jarillo, On Strategic Networks, 9 STRATEGIC 
MGMT. J. 31, 37 (1988). 
116. See text accompanying notes 74–77. 
117. See Wenpin Tsai & Sumatra Ghoshal, Social Structure of “Cooperation” Within a Multiunit 
Organization: Coordination, Competition, and Intraorganizational Knowledge Sharing, 13 ORG. SCI. 
179 (2002). 












she was around for the mistakes in the first place. Moreover, maintaining 
stability in teams allows coworkers to develop interpersonal relationships 
and have the kind of repeated social exchanges that build trust.119 
Because of the importance of trust within teams, companies design in 
trust mechanisms. Managers schedule in-person meetings to both ensure 
face-to-face relationship-building and to have some control over the flow of 
information.120 To build trust among team members and incent productivity, 
corporations create internal awards to highlight successful employees. 
Although competitions for awards can create intra-team competition, 
having clear and transparent award criteria, honoring more than one worker 
at a time, and rejecting zero-sum awards can increase trust within teams by 
assuring other team members that a coworker will be able to pull her 
weight.121  
Companies also embed non-disclosure and non-compete clauses into 
employment contracts to support what Amy Edmondson calls the 
“psychological safety” of trust within teams.122 The enforceability of 
covenants not to compete vary from state to state.123 But they can reassure 
employees that it is difficult for their coworkers to steal a good idea shared 
during a design meeting and engage in opportunistic behavior. Knowing 
that everyone is subject to the same limitation, coworkers can feel free to 
disclose new ways of solving problems without fear of losing a competitive 
advantage in the marketplace.124 
 
119. See id. at 156; see also Kathleen Carley, Organizational Learning and Personnel Turnover, 
3 ORG. SCI. 20, 22 (1992) (noting that memories of individuals on teams is essential for team and 
organizational learning). 
120. See Poltrock et al., supra note 110, at 242. 
121. See Inkpen & Tsang, supra note 115, at 158. 
122. Edmondson, Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior, supra note 113, at 350. But see 
THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT 
PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 111 (2008) (arguing that “companies can invoke confidentiality clauses in 
employee contracts” to prevent current and former employees from revealing “secret research”). 
123. Different states approach covenants not to compete differently. In 2016, President Obama 
issued an executive order that called for state legislatures to reform non-compete law. Exec. Order No. 
13,725, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,417 (Apr. 15, 2016). A related “Call to Action” urged states to (1) ban 
noncompete clauses for low-earning workers; (2) improve transparency and fairness; and (3) incentize 
employers to write enforceable contracts. WHITE HOUSE, STATE CALL TO ACTION ON NON-COMPETE 
AGREEMENTS, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/competition/ noncompetes-
calltoaction-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/PCM4-6W5J]. California generally rejects all non-compete 
clauses. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (2017). So does Colorado. See COL. REV. STAT. § 8-2-
113(2) (2017). Illinois strictly applies a reasonableness requirement. See, e.g., Cambridge Eng’g, Inc. v. 
Mercury Partners 90 BI, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 512 (Ill. 2007). Washington State is more permissive. See, 
e.g., Perry v. Moran, 748 P.2d 224, 229–30 (Wash. 1987); Knight, Vale & Gregory v. McDaniel, 680 
P.2d 448, 451–52 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). So is Massachusetts. See Marcam Corp. v. Orchard, 885 F. 
Supp. 294, 299 (D. Mass. 1995). 
124. See Inkpen & Tsang, supra note 115, at 158 (when members worry that they may be 
competing against each other, suspicion replaces trust and knowledge sharing is sacrificed). 











The law outside the company serves the same function. Many state courts 
are willing to enforce non-compete clauses and non-disclosure 
agreements.125 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) allows 
employers to sue employees who “intentionally [access] a computer without 
authorization or [exceed] authorized access” to steal company secrets.126 
And the law of trade secrecy prohibits employees from transferring 
corporate proprietary information to gain an unfair advantage.127 Trade 
secret law is overtly utilitarian in this respect: one of its primary purposes is 
to give companies—and, by extension, their employees doing the work—
the breathing space to innovate, create relationships, and share information 
knowing that bad, opportunistic behavior will be punished.128 This breathing 
space for innovation is another way of understanding the role of trust among 
teams of coworkers, and it only survives because it is buttressed by design 
and backed by law.129 
 
 
125. In addition to the cases cited in note 123, other cases show many states are willing to enforce 
non-compete clauses. See, e.g., Vital Images, Inc. v. Martel, No. 07-4195, 2007 WL 3095378, at *3 (D. 
Minn. Oct. 19, 2007); Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495, 501 
n.6 (E.D. Ky. 1996); Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544, 547 (Ohio 1975); Allen v. Rose Park 
Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 826 (Utah 1951). 
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2008); see also United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010); Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. 
Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 
2001). 
127. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 673–
74 (1960); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 757, Comment b (2017). 
128. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481–82 (1974) (discussing the 
purposes behind trade secret law); Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 434–35 (Pa. 1960) (focusing on 
the importance of trade secrecy in research and development). 
129. Undoubtedly, legal levers like covenants not to compete and trade secrecy can have negative 
social effects—the former are often thrust upon employees in contexts of unequal bargaining power, and 
companies use the latter to shield themselves from legal and public scrutiny. Rebecca Wexler, for 
example, has shown that trade secrecy is used in the criminal justice system to hide the ways algorithms 
decide the fate of some convicted of crimes. See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: 
Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018) (showing how trade 
secrecy is invoked in the criminal justice system). And according to Rachel Arnow-Richman, unequal 
bargaining positions make it “inappropriate to view noncompete terms as the product of reasoned 
reflection or as dispositive of the parties’ rights and obligations.” Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining 
for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing 
Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1215 (2001). This is true even for employees with 
particularly valuable skills: “[e]ven if a particular employee possesses valuable human capital that is in 
demand in the relevant market, . . . there are [substantive and procedural] reasons to distrust the quality 
of the bargain he or she reaches with the employer.” Id. at 1214. 
How, or whether, to deploy these tools are important sociolegal questions beyond the scope of this 
paper. For now, it is sufficient to note that one of the goals of covenants not to compete and trade secrecy 
is to create a zone of confidentiality around information sharing in the workplace. In that capacity, they 












C. Attorney-Client Relationships 
The attorney-client relationship is, like AA meetings and corporate 
teams, an overtly social environment where disclosure is both necessary and 
socially beneficial. As such, disclosure is designed into the relationship 
itself. The Supreme Court has recognized this, noting in UpJohn v. United 
States130 that effective advocacy depends on the “lawyer’s being fully 
informed by the client.”131  
The Supreme Court also long ago acknowledged the salient role of trust 
in the attorney-client relationship, noting in 1888 that a lawyer’s “assistance 
can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences 
or the apprehension of disclosure.”132 Therefore, trust norms compensate for 
the vulnerability inherent in sharing personal information with an 
attorney.133 Just like in AA meetings and within teams, that trust begins 
organically. We trust experts and other professionals based on their 
degrees.134 There is some evidence that we trust lawyers and doctors based 
on firm or hospital affiliations, respectively,135 and even office design.136 
The transference process does not end there. Many of us do not choose 
doctors and lawyers based solely on their degrees. Rather, we rely on the 
recommendations of others and, in particular, those that we respect.137 
But because going to a good law school or even coming recommended 
does not guarantee a lawyer will always act in her client’s interests,138 the 
legal profession designs in its own rules that support the organic trust of an 
attorney-client relationship. That private ordering comes from three 
sources: the oath that every lawyer takes upon being sworn into the bar;139 
 
130. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
131. Id. at 389. 
132. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 
40, 51 (1980). 
133. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 146 (1986) (noting that trust is 
important in attorney-client relationships to ensure full and frank disclosure). 
134. Doney et al., supra note 56, at 603. 
135. Mark A. Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and Medical Institutions: What Is It, Can It Be 
Measured, and Does It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613, 619–20 (2001). 
136. The Best Law Firm Offices in America: The Finalists!, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 30, 2012, 
6:19 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/08/the-best-law-firm-offices-in-america-the-finalists/2 [https:// 
perma.cc/K2LB-3R 28]. 
137. Rabin, supra note 57. 
138. Acting in a client’s interests is the sin qua non of fiduciary law. Fiduciaries are those that 
have special obligations of loyalty to another. Those loyalties are based on trust: a trustor, client, or 
beneficiary hands over money, control, and information to another, who, in turn, has a duty not to betray 
that trust. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 106–08 (2011). 
139. The oath of admission for the United States federal courts, for example, is as follows: “I 
__________ do solemnly swear (or affirm) that as an attorney and as a counselor of this court I will 
conduct myself uprightly and according to law, and that I will support the Constitution of the United 











the American Bar Association, which has developed Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct;140 and bar association ethics opinions, which 
interpret the rules and give lawyers guidance on particular ethical 
dilemmas.141 At the heart of these ethical codes and guidelines is 
confidentiality.142 Together, these self-regulatory tools remind clients that 
they can speak freely with their attorneys, share personal, even stigmatizing 
information, trusting that their lawyer will keep their confidences. 
That trust is also enforced by the courts and other legal levers. Ethics 
rules are enforced by state disciplinary regimes.143 Courts also rely on codes 
of professional ethics when poorly-served clients bring motions to 
disqualify.144 The law of professional malpractice allows clients to sue their 
attorneys for, among other things, betraying their confidences.145 And the 
attorney-client privilege protects communications between lawyers and 
their clients in court. In Trammel v. United States,146 the Court stated that 
the rationale for this, and the priest-penitent and doctor-patient, privileges 
is explicitly based on trust: 
These privileges are rooted in the imperative need for confidence and 
trust. The priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human need to 
disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, 
what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly 
consolation and guidance in return. The lawyer-client privilege rests 
on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to 
the client’s reasons for seeking representation if the professional 
mission is to be carried out. Similarly, the physician must know all 
that a patient can articulate in order to identify and to treat disease; 
 
States.” See Attorney Oath of Admission, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao153_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3SR-NUWM]. 




141. See Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More Effective Regulation of 
Lawyers’ Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 313 (2002) (discussing the role of ethics opinions). 
142. See, e.g., MODEL RULES r. 1.6, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_ 
responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_6_confidentiality_of_inform
ation/ [https://perma.cc/8TG3-KESK]. 
143. See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (1998) (noting that since the ABA’s 
Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement chastised lawyer discipline as 
“scandalous,” the role of the state in enforcing attorney ethical standard has increased). 
144. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753 
(1975) (starting with attorney ethics rules during a motion to disqualify). 
145. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of Negligence Law, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 662–82 (1998) (describing legal malpractice as a subset of negligence law and 
identifying gaps in the model for tortious legal malpractice developed by William Prosser). 












barriers to full disclosure would impair diagnosis and treatment.147 
Therefore, law, through the use of the courts as enforcement mechanisms 
and the doctrines of malpractice and privilege, helps balance out the 
powerful disclosure norms in attorney-client relationships with equally as 
powerful norms of trust. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF TECHNOSOCIAL SPACES 
No social space is perfectly safe; there is no way to guard against all 
opportunistic or malicious behavior. AA members are sometimes outed, 
workers steal secrets, and lawyers betray confidences. But within those 
social spaces, actors share with the expectation, designed in and backed by 
law, that their information will be kept confidential. And society benefits as 
a result. That’s how it’s supposed to work.  
Technosocial spaces, or those in which technology mediates social 
interaction, are different. Although they, like offline contexts, are 
characterized by powerful pressures to disclose, their technical architecture, 
internal rules, and the legal and regulatory environment in which they 
operate do not support the kind of trust that protects users from harm. In 
fact, they do the opposite. Technosocial platforms are designed to entice and 
manipulate disclosure with false trust. And the law lets them do it. These 
missing pieces make these spaces unsafe, and ripe for harassment and 
invasions of privacy. This is evident from two case studies described below: 
online social networks and interactions with social robots. 
A. Disclosure and Other Risks 
Disclosure is the lifeblood of technosocial spaces. Without sharing our 
likes, opinions, and behaviors, technosocial platforms could not achieve 
their goals of bringing people together.148 Nor could they learn from us, 
adapt to our needs, and provide the kinds of conveniences consumers seem 
to want. And they certainly couldn’t process, analyze, and sell our data for 
profit.149 Facebook needs our data to sell billions of dollars in targeted 
advertising space. Artificial intelligence needs our data to learn. Dating apps 
 
147. Id. at 51. The phrase “confidence and trust” as a basis for the privilege doctrine is repeated 
in ninety-eight federal, state, and international cases citing Trammel. 
148. Facebook’s mantra is “bring the world closer together.” See Josh Constine, Facebook 
Changes Mission Statement to ‘Bring the World Closer Together’, TECHCRUNCH (June 26, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/ 2017/06/22/bring-the-world-closer-together/ [https://perma.cc/5ETB-PFH8].  
149. See, e.g., Mark Hachman, The Price of Free: How Apple, Facebook, Microsoft and Google 
Sell You to Advertisers, PCWORLD (Oct. 1, 2015, 3:00 AM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/2986988/ 
privacy/the-price-of-free-how-apple-facebook-microsoft-and-google-sell-you-to-advertisers.html [https 
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need our data to match us to others. Disclosure is a necessary part of 
technosocial spaces. 
This poses risks to our safety. Twitter has a long history of tolerating 
hate and harassment on its platform, contributing to the silencing of women 
and users from other marginalized communities.150 Some dating apps and 
websites do little even when they know their platforms are rife with racism, 
homophobia, and harassment.151 And some websites invite their users to 
post images of nonconsensual pornography.152 Our privacy is also in danger. 
Facebook’s has for years taken a cavalier approach to third-party access to 
user data, giving companies we don’t know access to our personal 
information.153 Google, like a myriad of other digital platforms, mines 
terabytes of personal data for behavioral targeting.154 Snapchat made us 
think we had control over the shelf lives of the photos and videos we sent 
to other users, but the reality was far different.155 The list goes on. 
Social robots,156 like PARO, the therapeutic baby seal,157 or Sony’s Aibo 
dog.158 They pose some similar and some unique dangers by virtue of their 
social abilities, including communication, cooperation, and learning.159 
Social robots are machines that collect vast amounts of data behind a veil of 
human-like social features.160 They can also perpetuate intimate partner 
 
150. See, e.g., Monique Judge, Twitter Has a Serious Harassment and Abuse Problem but Doesn’t 
Seem to Want to Cure It, ROOT (Oct. 30, 2017, 4:59 PM), https://www.theroot.com/twitter-has-a-
serious-harassment-and-abuse-problem-but-1819979725 [https://perma.cc/D65X-F96A]; see also 
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 3. 
151. See, e.g., Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); see also Waldman, 
Law, Privacy, and Online Dating, supra note 6 (discussing the experience of some users who report 
notifying platforms of terms of service violations, but never receiving responses or remediation). 
152. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 343 (2014). 
153. See, e.g., Alvin Chang, The Facebook and Cambridge Analytica Scandal, Explained with a 
Simple Diagram, VOX (May 2, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/23/ 
17151916/facebook-cambridge-analytica-trump-diagram [https://perma.cc/7S42-T2QH]. 
154. See Steven Melendez, How Google is Breaking EU Privacy Law, According to a New 
Complaint, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90236273/google-faces-
gdpr-privacy-complai nt-over-its-targeted-ads-from-brave-browser [https://perma.cc/6JU3-2YGK]. 
155. Complaint, Snapchat, Inc., 79 Fed. Reg. 27611 (F.T.C. May 8, 2014) (FTC File No. 132 
3078), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140508snapchatcmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5CFF-YWC9] [hereinafter Snapchat Complaint]. 
156. See Kate Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots, in ROBOT LAW 214 (Ryan 
Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016) (defining social robots as physically embodied agents 
that interact with and learn from humans on a social level). 
157. See PARO Therapeutic Robot, PARO, http://www.parorobots.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/KU5K-USZH]. 
158. See AIBO, https://us.aibo.com/ [https://perma.cc/KKN8-VMJL]. 
159. Cynthia Breazeal, Toward Sociable Robots, 42 ROBOTICS & AUTONOMOUS SYS. 167, 168 
(2003). 
160. See M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and Technology 
Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809, 817–25 (2010) [hereinafter Calo, People Can Be So Fake] 
(discussing how cyberlaw has traditionally focused on data collection as the salient privacy problem 












surveillance,161 suffocate autonomy,162 and eliminate opportunities for 
solitude.163 They can spy on us and nudge us to buy things.164 And our 
connections to social robots can be leveraged to manipulate us into paying 
for high-priced upgrades or responding to advertisements snuck into 
answers and responses.165 
As Ryan Calo has argued, social robots have three essential qualities that 
help us understand the risks they pose to our privacy: embodiment, 
emergence, and social valence. Social robots are embodied in that they 
occupy physical form. They may be programmed to act based on a coded 
series of ones and zeros, but we phenomenologically experience social 
robots taking physical action in the physical world.166 Robots are also 
emergent in that they (and their programming) can learn and adapt to new 
circumstances and new demands.167 To us, then, social robots are part of an 
ongoing social dance of back-and-forth interaction much like humans.168 
And they have a social valence in that and we tend to use social models to 
understand them.169 This is why we tend to become uncomfortable with and 
resistant to behaviors that would “harm” robots;170 their shape, verbal skills, 
 
(2015) [hereinafter Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots] (discussing all the ways robots can spy on 
their human users). 
161. See Freed et al., supra note 7. 
162. See Calo, People Can Be So Fake, supra note 160, at 847; see also M. Ryan Calo, Robots 
and Privacy, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTS 187, 195 (Patrick 
Lin et al. eds., 2012); M. Ryan Calo, The Drone As Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29 
(2011) (backlash around robots bound up with cultural depictions of robots); M. Ryan Calo, Against 
Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012) [hereinafter Calo, 
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164. See Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, supra note 160, at 797–802. 
165. See Darling, supra note 156, at 221. 
166. See Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 532–37 
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explicit perceptions.”). Mark Coeckelbergh has taken a phenomenological approach to robots, arguing 
that ethics for robotics should start at the point of human perception rather than technical definitions of 
robots. See, e.g., Mark Coeckelbergh, Robot Rights? Towards a Social-Relational Justification for 
Moral Consideration, 12 ETHICS & INFO TECH. 209 (2010); Mark Coeckelbergh, Humans, Animals, and 
Robots: A Phenomenological Approach to Human-Robot Relations, 3 INT’L J. OF SOC. ROBOTICS 197 
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(2009). 
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adaptability, and seemingly autonomous actions distinguish them from 
machines, appliances, and tools in our minds.171  
For these reasons, social robots create social spaces that put our privacy 
at risk. We interact with social robots in ways similar to interacting with 
humans because regardless of our intellectual ability to recognize that robots 
aren’t human, robots with human qualities feel social to us. This isn’t 
accidental. Social robots are specifically designed to trigger our 
predisposition to anthropomorphize,172 and to induce the kind of trust we 
usually reserve for other humans. This lulls us into a false sense of security, 
thus increasing our propensity to disclose personal information to a data-
hungry corporation hiding behind a social veil. Woodrow Hartzog has 
called this “the most fundamental reason we are vulnerable to robots.”173  
These problems exist in part because online social networks and social 
robots are built to encourage disclosure. But instead of supporting 
disclosure and user safety with trust-building design, technosocial spaces 
leverage design to cue false trust among their members, putting up a veneer 
in front of massive, invasive data collection and sharing with third parties. 
And the law lets them do it. Therefore, online social networks and social 
robots create unsafe social spaces. 
B. Organic Trust in Technosocial Spaces 
All of the social forces that naturally generate trust among individuals 
offline are present in technosocial spaces. Our propensity to disclose 
information on online social networks is positively correlated with the 
number of friends—and even more so with the number of close friends—
we have on the platform.174 In one study, eighty-five percent of users said 
would accept a Facebook “friend” request from a stranger if they shared a 
sufficient number of mutual friends and eighty-one percent would do the 
same if the stranger was friends with their close friends.175 The vast majority 
of users who identify as LGBTQ would accept a friend request from a 
stranger simply because they also identified as queer176 and gay and bisexual 
men tend to trust strangers on queer-only dating apps because of the 
 
171. Don Ihde has argued that robots’ meaning in society is “multistable”: we may sometimes see 
robots as machines and sometimes see them as more than machines. See DON IHDE, TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE LIFEWORLD (1990). 
172. Darling, supra note 156, at 214. 
173. Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, supra note 160, at 791. 
174. See Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust, supra note 61, at 216–17. 
175. Id. at 219. 












platform’s inherent queerness,177 thus lending credibility to the theory that 
sharing an out-group identity can build trust. 
Users also build trust through experience, over time, and via interaction. 
Dating app users tend to share images of themselves after “chatting with the 
other person” for a time, ranging from a few hours to a few weeks. 
Reciprocity also inspires trust and, thereby, sharing of personal information. 
Queer users of online social networks believe strongly in reciprocal sharing 
because the mutual surveillance it allows can inspire trust and thus mitigate 
the risks inherent in sharing nude or seminude images.178 
Trust generation is even more organic in social spaces involving social 
robots. We have an innate, evolutionary need to connect with others,179 and 
we naturally apply social models to understand and interact with the world 
around us.180 One of those social models is anthropomorphization, or 
ascribing human characteristics to nonhuman things, like when we talk to 
our dogs or stuffed animals or when Tom Hanks paints a face on a volleyball 
in Cast Away.181  
Our natural, “inborn” tendency to connect with social robots182 grows 
stronger as objects take on more humanlike characteristics. Hanks painted 
a face on his volleyball, which only then could be perceived as a head. Many 
people put eyes on their Roombas,183 and two-thirds of Roomba owners give 
them names.184 Human users bonded with ELIZA, a computer 
psychoanalysis program that asked users questions like a therapist and filled 
in conversations with dummy placeholder comments, prompting the lead 
experimenter to issue a warning call about the manipulative effects of 
artificial intelligence.185 And another study showed that humans will engage 
happily and politely with kind and polite computer programs.186 
Since social robots have more humanish qualities than Roombas or 
desktop computers, the trust that develops between humans and social 
robots is likely even more powerful than the trust developed in these 
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experiments. Sherry Turkle has shown that people of all ages establish tight 
bonds with social robots. After playing with a humanish robot that could 
make eye contact, follow a child around, and imitate the child’s movements, 
an eleven-year-old called her social robot “something that’s part of you, . . 
. something you love, kind of like another person, like a baby.”187 A seventy-
one-year-old user of a furry robot that looked like a koala bear also noted 
that “[w]hen I looked into his large, brown eyes, I fell in love after years of 
being quite lonely . . . [and] I swore to protect and care for the little 
animal.”188 Other studies have shown that people playing prisoner dilemma 
games with technological interfaces tended to keep their promises with 
more humanish partners.189 There are a growing number of persuasive 
studies just like these.190 Suffice it to say, as Karl MacDorman and Hiroshi 
Ishiguro note, “[h]uman-like appearance and behavior . . . elicit the sorts of 
responses that people typically direct toward one another.”191 And the more 
humanish they get, “the more human-directed . . . expectations are 
elicited.”192 Central to those expectations is trust. 
C. Manipulative Designs that Entice Disclosure 
Rather than using design to counterbalance powerful norms of disclosure 
to support organic trust, technosocial spaces leverage design to elicit more 
disclosure by creating a veneer of false trust where actually none exists. 
There are many examples of this,193 but the designs of Snapchat, Facebook 
News Feeds, and embodied social robots are paradigmatic. 
Snapchat was originally designed to manipulate disclosure by creating 
the appearance of trust. It sold itself as a privacy-protective platform by 
highlighting a design choice that made any image or video, or “snap,” sent 
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across its platform would automatically disappear after several seconds and 
could not be retained by users. Except, it was not originally designed that 
way. Before sending a snap, users were shown a screen that required them 
to designate the amount of time the snap will survive before disappearing, 
thus building expectations of confidentiality and discretion and a sense of 
user control.194 Snaps could not be sent without selecting an option. In 
reality, there were several ways snaps sent could be saved, downloaded, or 
copied.195 This gave users the false impression, reinforced in the platform’s 
product descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions,196 that they actually 
had control over what their recipients could do with their snaps. 
There was no trust designed into Snapchat. Until October 2013, it stored 
all videos in unprotected spaces on users’ phones, which allowed recipients 
to simply search for and download a video they wanted to save.197 Snapchat 
also allowed any third-party application to access its application 
programming interface and download or copy videos and images.198 Not 
only were these vulnerabilities not conveyed to users, but the platform’s 
design created contrary expectations. 
Facebook designs its interface to deliver cues of trust to its members so 
they will share more personal information: it creates a sense of community 
through rich profiles, privileges our friends’ posts so we see them first, and 
publicly informs us of our friends’ online behavior to encourage reciprocal 
sharing.199 Facebook’s News Feed, the running list of stories and posts from 
our friends, is designed to make it difficult for users to distinguish between 
social posts and native advertisements. Among other design tactics, both 
types of posts are prefaced by notices about our friends’ interactions—
“Jane, Joe, and 18 others liked this”—and both are followed by notifications 
of our friends’ comments—“David, Maggy, and 27 others commented on 
this post.” This design cues trust: users can look to Jane, Joe, David, and 
Maggy and feel confident that the post is social, meaningful, and relevant. 
But when the same trust cues appear on an advertisement, on a link to a third 
 
194. Snapchat Complaint, supra note 155, at ¶6. 
195. Id. at ¶¶ 9–17. Much of the FTC’s case against Snapchat focused on the company’s failure 
to disclose certain data collection practices in its privacy statement. See id. ¶¶ 8–33. But broken promises 
litigation is just one part of the FTC’s privacy jurisprudence. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, 
The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 667 (2014). As Solove & 
Hartzog point out, the FTC has developed a broader view of unfair or deceptive practices, including, for 
example, “deception by omission,” id. at 631, “inducement” to share personal information, id. at 632–
33, and “pretexting,” id. at 633, to name just a few. Their persuasive argument is that “through a common 
law-like process, the FTC’s actions have developed into a rich jurisprudence that is effectively the law 
of the land for businesses that deal in personal information.” Id. at 589. 
196. Snapchat Complaint, supra note 155, at ¶¶ 7–8. 
197. Id. at ¶ 10. 
198. Id. at ¶ 11. 
199. See Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust, supra note 61, at 221–23. 











party whose data collection practices are unknown, or, worse yet, on click 
bait to a radically invasive quiz or website,200 the design transfers the trust 
we have in our friends to a third-party advertiser about which we know little. 
These design tactics hide privacy risks from users, cuing trust where no 
protections for users actually exist. 
Social robots also use design to cue false trust. By creating machines that 
mimic human behavior while looking like adorable baby seals or having 
other anthropomorphic characteristics, social robots lull us into a false sense 
of trust. And they tend to manipulate the most vulnerable among us: the 
elderly, the disabled, and the lonely.201 Advanced social robots use sounds, 
language, and movement in ways reminiscent of, if not identical to, humans. 
As such, social robots have the capacity to appear trustworthy; they can be 
partners in ongoing social interaction. For Erving Goffman, social 
interaction is an ongoing dance, with both leaders and followers sharing 
responsibility for continuing the dance: individuals determine what they 
want to reveal and their partners (Goffman calls them the “audience”) keep 
up the charade of persona management by playing along.202 Social robots 
play along, as well. They generally behave in expected ways: Alexa answers 
questions,203 Roombas skate along the floor, robot butlers get coffee. We 
are meant to experience them phenomenologically and, therefore, see the 
designed-in humanish qualities rather than the technology company lurking 
behind the curtain.  
They are, then, classic “Wizard of Oz” setups with unique abilities to 
harm.204 As Jacqueline Kory Westlund and Cynthia Breazeal note, users 
“may not realiz[e] that a human is hearing everything they say.”205 “Given 
that social robots are designed to draw us in, often engaging us emotionally 
and building relationships with us, the robot itself could be deceptive in that 
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it appears to” make a connection, “but ‘in reality,’” it’s just gathering data 
on us.206 Ian Kerr presciently recognized this over a decade ago: “Like 
Hollywood’s finest directors, who are able to steer their audiences’ attention 
away from the false assumptions that they have so skillfully engendered, 
some software programmers are applying principles of cognitive science to 
develop electronic entities that garner consumer trust. Unfortunately, some 
e-businesses are exploiting these applications to garner trust where no such 
trust is warranted.”207 
D. Legal and Regulatory Void 
Technology companies that design technosocial platforms are allowed to 
leverage design in manipulative ways because, for the most part, the law 
allows it. Legal regimes like malpractice law, tort law, trademark law, and 
private ordering schemes like professional licensing requirements constrain 
the opportunistic behavior of information trustees in the offline context.208 
Digital spaces do not just lack comparable legal levers. The laws that do 
exist actively promote insecurity and risk to users. 
Online social networks have no legal incentive to police their platforms 
for hate and harassment because Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act immunizes them for most third party conduct on their 
platforms.209 Section 230 was passed in reaction to a lawsuit against 
Prodigy, one of the original online service providers.210 At the time, Prodigy 
filtered profanity and other harmful content out of its platform, holding itself 
out as a family-friendly technosocial space.211 After a user posted 
defamatory comments about a securities company, the firm sued Prodigy, 
arguing that Prodigy should be liable as publisher of the defamation.212 The 
New York Supreme Court agreed.213  
Section 230 was then introduced in Congress by then-Representative 
Christopher Cox of California and now-Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon to 
overturn the Prodigy case and to protect internet service providers from 
lawsuits focusing on imperfect filtering.214 Congress stated that it passed the 
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law to preserve the internet as “a forum for a true diversity” of views “with 
a minimum of government regulation,” and to maintain “the vibrant and 
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet . . . unfettered 
by Federal or State regulation.”215  
Congress’s other reason for enacting Section 230 was to encourage 
Internet intermediaries, users, and parents to self-police the Internet for 
obscene conduct.216 But in interpreting the clause, federal courts cemented 
broad immunity for platforms, leaving no legal incentive to police bad 
behavior. In Zeran v. America Online,217 for example, the Fourth Circuit 
noted that lawsuits against providers for third-party content would risk 
“freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.”218 In a an 
expansive, maximalist holding, the court stated that “Section 230 was 
enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication, 
and accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a 
minimum.”219 This and other broad immunity decisions created an online 
world where platforms have no legal incentive to make their platforms safe 
and where perpetrators do not fear the consequences of their actions. 
Nor does current law encourage online social networks or the designers 
of social robots to protect user privacy. Although new privacy laws like 
Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)220 and California’s 
Consumer Privacy Act,221 and the renewed prospect for comprehensive 
privacy legislation in the United States,222 offer the promise of reasonable 
constraints on predatory data collectors, United States consumers are still 
operating under a notice-and-choice regime that carries with it minimal 
obligations for technology companies.223 Notice-and-choice requires 
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companies that collect our data to describe their data collection tactics and 
data use practices, and to give us the opportunity to opt out.224 Privacy 
policies are, therefore, its primary legal tool. As a doctrine of informed 
consent,225 notice-and-choice is supposed to give us control over our data 
by giving us the information we need to make rational disclosure decisions. 
But the regime is inadequate. Not only are privacy policies 
incomprehensible,226 but the entire endeavor of notice-and-choice is 
premised on the myth of an autonomous user.227 We do not make perfectly 
rational disclosure decisions, and we wouldn’t even if we could comprehend 
privacy policies.228 Far from providing any real notice, the consent model 
employed today actually disempowers users by putting them in a position 
in which their consent—“Click ‘I agree’ to continue”—is used as an excuse 
to allow companies to use data how they see fit. Consent, then, extracts 
power that should belong to users.229  
And the prospect of change under the GDPR is slim. Some scholars have 
argued that the GDPR is little more than the old notice-and-choice regime 
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with a few new bells and whistles.230 Some of its language is impossibly 
vague and of little help in supporting and fostering safe sharing online.231 
Social robots exist in a similar regulatory void. Their data use practices, 
at least in the United States, are governed by a notice-and-choice regime, 
and they don’t even have webpage interfaces on which one can find a 
privacy policy. And, although the FTC has the power to regulate the 
manipulative design strategies of social robots,232 it has yet to exercise that 
authority in any significant way.233 That could be because social robots are 
so new. It could also be because the FTC continues to defer to a self-
regulation privacy regime, which gives technology companies the power to 
set the terms of industry practice. 
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO DESIGN AND LAW 
So far, I have argued that law and design must work together to buttress 
trust norms that protect socially beneficial disclosures. I have also shown 
that current law and design thinking do the opposite when it comes to 
technosocial spaces. They are leveraged to promote disclosures that benefit 
technology companies, but put users at risk. We can change that. We need 
to design our technosocial spaces to build trust endogenously, and we need 
law to both incent technology companies to design for privacy and safety 
and protect users when something goes wrong. 
A. Designing for Trust and Safety 
Technosocial spaces can be designed to enhance trust, protect our 
privacy, and keep us safe. As noted earlier, “design” refers to the set of 
processes throughout which new technologies are built and come about.234 
As such, both technical specifications and corporate practices matter. 
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On the technology side, online social networks can change defaults to 
better protect our privacy. On Venmo, a social network for online 
transactions, interactions are public by default “because it’s fun” to see what 
our friends are buying, the company says.235 Corporate perceptions of user 
entertainment aside, this choice only makes sense in a world where privacy 
gets short shrift in design. Settings should default to privacy-protective 
options, giving users the power to determine for themselves what 
information they will share, when they share it, and with whom. This is one 
of the principles behind privacy by design. 
Although I am skeptical that a notice-and-choice regime could ever do 
much good, notice can be improved. Warnings about privacy risks could 
reach users on a visceral or emotional level rather than merely through 
incomprehensible privacy policies.236 This would be especially useful in 
technosocial spaces involving social robots, where websites are absent. On 
social networks, sponsored posts on Facebook could use distinguishing 
colors and presentation to separate them from social posts from our 
friends.237 So-called “just in time” notifications, or popups that inform users 
of data collection as it happens, could help users make better, in-the-
moment decisions.238 And social websites could be redesigned to require 
users to opt-in to data collection, as required in some circumstances by the 
GDPR.239 Remaining opt-out tools that protect users from behavioral 
tracking and cookies could be built in to browsers, obviating the need to 
opt-out of data collection every time we visit a website.240 
Safety by design could involve ephemeral messaging for intimate 
images, access restrictions, streamlined takedown procedures, and 
frictionless tagging of profiles that spew hate, engage in harassment, and 
violate other terms of use.241 For example, the queer-oriented dating app 
Scruff allows users to easily tag profiles that are racist, hateful, and 
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harassing. Reporting procedures are in-app, meaning users do not have to 
click through to a second or third webpage to find a reporting form. The 
information necessary is also limited: the flag and a brief explanation of the 
incident or pattern of behavior are sufficient to initiate Scruff’s forty-eight-
hour window for responding to all flags and harassment claims. That 
frictionless reporting regime may be at least part of the reason why Scruff 
has few, if any, problems with racist profiles and revenge pornography.242  
Designing for trust also requires broad corporate commitments that reach 
into the daily work of privacy and safety. Elsewhere, I have argued that 
robust visions of privacy may not make their way into technology product 
design because some designers—the engineers on the ground—do not share 
a commitment to privacy.243 Nor do they have the educational and 
conceptual tools to spot ambiguous privacy issues raised by code.244 
Technology companies can address part of this problem endogenously by 
integrating privacy and law into the design process. Companies should 
include lawyers, sociologists, and other social scientists in design meetings. 
At a minimum, these experts could be co-located with engineering teams. 
And privacy should be included in corporate missions and designer training, 
reinforced throughout their term of employment. In short, privacy has to be 
part of both the ethos and routine of designers and their employers.245 
Social platforms can also reorient their content moderation policies 
toward protecting marginalized populations, sexual privacy,246 and the 
safety of their users. Content moderation is a mixture of technology design 
(artificial intelligence) and human capital resources247 deployed to create 
social environments for their users.248 Kate Klonick has argued that 
platforms try to moderate content to match the expectations of their users, 
which include protections for free speech as well as online safety.249 But 
much of that work is influenced by traditional First Amendment doctrine: 
the people who conceptualized social media’s place in the speech 
governance ecosystem and developed moderation policies were lawyers 
steeped in First Amendment law they had learned in school and practiced in 
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the courtroom.250 It should come as no surprise that content moderation 
started from a “baseline” of liberal free speech norms.251 Moderation 
policies could instead be designed to tip the scales in favor of safety rather 
than unfettered speech. Because the underlying policies still remain the 
same, recent steps to ban right-wing hate are welcome, yet woefully 
insufficient steps in this regard.252 
B. Law to Support Trust and Safety 
Technology companies need legal incentives to design for real trust and 
safety, especially where such design may complicate data collection in an 
economy dependent upon it.253 That may be a heavy lift, but reasonable 
changes are necessary to protect users. This section describes four legal 
levers we can push: fiduciary law, FTC enforcement, privacy by design, and 
reform to Section 230. 
1. Information Fiduciaries 
If we want technosocial spaces to inspire trust and foster safe and socially 
beneficial disclosure in ways similar to AA meetings, teams of coworkers, 
and attorney-client relationships, then we should treat technology platforms 
as information fiduciaries.254 Fiduciaries have special obligations of loyalty 
because we put our trust in them. Estate managers, investment advisers, 
lawyers, and doctors are classic examples of fiduciaries: they handle our 
money, secrets, and lives under duties of loyalty and care.255 As Jack Balkin 
has observed, fiduciary duties are “duties of trust;” the word fiduciary even 
comes from the Latin word for trust.256 And, as we have seen, we share 
information with others in contexts of trust.257 Even Justice Gorsuch 
recognized this point in his dissent in Carpenter v. United States,258 where 
he challenged the Third Party Doctrine’s erosion of privacy by noting that 
“[p]eople often do reasonably expect that information they entrust to third 
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parties . . . will be kept private.”259 A bill proposed at the end of the 115th 
Congress by Senator Brian Schatz of Hawaii reflected some of these 
ideas.260 
Technology companies running technosocial platforms should be 
considered information fiduciaries for the same reasons that doctors, 
lawyers, and investment advisers are considered traditional fiduciaries. We 
are vulnerable to them because they know everything about us. We are 
dependent on them because of the services they provide and the expertise 
they bring to those services. And they hold themselves out as sufficiently 
trustworthy to gain our business.261 
This would have profound effects on users, design, and corporate 
policies. Information fiduciaries should, first and foremost, never act like 
“con men.” Conning users would be like using dark patterns to purposely 
extract personal information against user wishes or Google Maps holding 
itself out as providing the best or fastest route from JFK International 
Airport to the West Village and then delivering a route that drives passed a 
Chipotle because Chipotle paid Google $100. Information fiduciaries would 
not be able to leverage data in ways that violate social norms. Nor could 
they use our data to manipulate, lie, or take away our freedom.262 An 
information fiduciaries approach would let us use our credit cards knowing 
our purchasing histories will not be abused for profit. We could share 
personal information to find love and companionship. We could use Alexas 
or Cortanas knowing no one was listening in without our consent. 
2. Empowering the FTC 
We need a privacy regulator capable of investigating and rooting out 
corporate deception and manipulation that is subtler, yet far more insidious 
than lying on a privacy policy. An information fiduciary approach would 
help, but as Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog have shown, the FTC 
already has a long track record of regulating deceptive practices that erode 
our privacy.263 To guard against social robots creating false veneers—so-
called “Wizard-of-Oz” setups and misleadingly operated devices, for 
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example264—Hartzog notes that the FTC has already challenged deceptive 
demonstrations that present products as better than they actually are.265 And 
to address the ways in which robots gather information while evading 
traditional notice modalities, Hartzog notes that the FTC should take Ryan 
Calo’s suggestion to shift to requiring “visceral” notices that leverage “a 
consumer’s very experience of a product or service to warn or inform.”266  
In short, the FTC can pay additional attention to predatory, unfair, or 
deceptive design that elicits disclosure while eroding trust. Its steps in that 
direction are promising, but insufficient. For example, in Sony BMG, the 
FTC challenged a design decision that automatically installed digital rights 
management software on customers’ computers without notice and without 
a reasonable simple way of removing it. 267 In Frostwire, the FTC took 
action when a program automatically designated some files available for 
public sharing, suggesting an interest in default settings.268 Although both 
of these cases involve design, the FTC is still slow to give up its reliance on 
broken promises litigation. In Sony BMG, for instance, the phrase 
“Respondent has failed to disclose, or has failed to disclose adequately, 
that” prefaces two substantive allegations against the company; 269 the third 
simply alleged that deceptive software was “installed on consumers’ 
computers without adequate notification and consent.”270 Frostwire more 
squarely addressed design,271 but even there the FTC noted that the company 
failed to disclose what its software would actually do.272 Emphasizing the 
role trust plays in user privacy and safety means recognizing that certain 
design choices can be deceptive even with conspicuous notice. The FTC 
isn’t there yet. 
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The FTC also needs the ability to write rules to clarify its authority. The 
purpose of agency rulemaking is to specify vague statutory requirements, 
offering clear notice as to what the law requires, an opportunity to 
participate in public governance, and a comprehensive resolution of 
questions facing large numbers of persons and businesses.273 However, the 
FTC is limited by the “procedurally burdensome” process of Magnuson-
Moss rulemaking,274 which requires the FTC to conduct industry-wide 
investigations, prepare reports, propose rules, engage in a series of public 
hearings, and consider other alternatives.275 The process is so difficult that 
the FTC has not engaged in this type of rulemaking in thirty-seven years.276 
This lack of rulemaking authority ensures that, without more, privacy 
regulation from the FTC will remain vague; the only other way to discern 
what the FTC means by a specific term or phrase is to turn to its previous 
consent decrees, which is what many practitioners do.277 But that common 
law analysis cannot achieve the level of clarity rulemaking can. If applied 
to Section 5 of the FTC Act, which only prohibits “unfair and deceptive” 
practices, and any other privacy statute, rulemaking could help clarify what 
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3. Privacy by Design 
We can also build on the model of the GDPR and codify privacy by 
design as a legal mandate.278 Privacy by design is the notion that privacy 
should be part of the design process for new technologies rather than tacked 
on at the end as an afterthought. It is meant to proactively protect consumer 
privacy and reduce the risks consumers face when using data collection 
tools while making privacy a priority inside technology companies.279 
But beyond this general understanding, there remains considerable 
uncertainty as to what privacy by design will mean in practice. The GDPR’s 
formulation is so broad it is almost devoid of meaning, only requiring data 
collectors take technical and organizational steps to implement the data 
protection principles listed elsewhere in the GDPR.280 The academic 
literature includes no fewer than seven other definitions of privacy by 
design, none of which gives companies, consumers, and regulators 
sufficient notice as to the law’s practical requirements.281 Elsewhere, I have 
argued that privacy by design can transition to privacy’s law of design by 
learning from the law of products liability for design defects. It would then 
require technology companies to, throughout a product’s lifecycle, balance 
the products’ benefits to consumers against their foreseeable privacy risks 
and only place in commerce those products that achieve reasonably similar 
consumer benefit with the least privacy risk. This duty would include the 
responsibility to inform users, throughout the lifecycle of products, of how 
the products collect and process data and of all foreseeable privacy risks in 
a manner that adequately and comprehensibly conveys those risks to an 
ordinary user.282 By providing a specific legal frame in which designers can 
innovate new technologies, this formulation of privacy by design would 
both provide for trust and encourage the organizational changes necessary 




278. See GDPR, supra note 220, art. 25, at 48. 
279. See ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN 3 (2009), https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-
content/uploads/Resources/PrivacybyDesignBook.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4CW-C6YU]; see also ANN 
CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES (2009), 
https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/resources/7foundationalprinciples.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5M4T-FQ58]. 
280. See GDPR, supra note 220, art. 25, at 48 (“the controller shall . . .. . . implement appropriate 
technical and organisational measures . . . which are designed to implement data-protection principles . 
. . in an effective manner”). 
281. See Waldman, Privacy’s Law of Design, supra note 26, at 1253–56. 
282. Id. at 1285. 











4. Reform to Section 230 
More immediate relief can come from modest reform to the broad 
immunity of Section 230.283 Danielle Citron and Benjamin Wittes have 
proposed that Section 230 immunity be extended only to “good 
Samaritans,” or “providers or users engaged in good faith efforts to restrict 
illegal activity.”284 This is a good idea, and one that would incent platforms 
to protect their users and foster the kind of trust necessary for social 
interaction while preserving robust speech online and protecting companies 
from being buried under lawsuits for honest mistakes.  
Protecting only those platforms that act in good faith is, in fact, what 
Congress intended from the beginning.285 Section 230(c)(2),286 which 
immunizes platforms from suits related to any “action voluntarily taken in 
good faith to restrict access to . . . material that . . . [is] harassing or otherwise 
objectionable,” is actually called the “Good Samaritan” provision.287 It was 
meant to incent trust-enhancing design, not create social spaces that look 
like the Wild West. That the federal courts interpreting Section 230 turned 
away from Congressional intent and the plain language is an accident of 
history: a bug, rather than a feature, of the law. 
This kind of limitation on platform immunity would protect platforms 
that earnestly try to filter out harassing content but make honest mistakes. 
It would, however, constrain those platforms that ignore their users’ 
consistent complaints about racism, harassment, revenge pornography, and 
other behaviors that violate terms of service and make technosocial spaces 
unsafe. It would, in short, buttress content moderation designed for user 
safety and trust. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article began with a problem: technosocial spaces can be unsafe 
and privacy invasive. But it also saw an opportunity: to learn by analogy 
from offline social spaces—Alcoholics Anonymous, teams of coworkers, 
and attorney-client relationships—that facilitate socially beneficial 
disclosures by counterbalancing norms of disclosure with equally powerful 
norms of trust that are both endogenously designed and exogenously 
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supported by law. With those analogies in mind, the Article proposed 
several specific ways trust can be designed in to technosocial spaces using 
code and four legal levers—fiduciary law, consumer protection, products 
liability, and intermediary liability—that could be leveraged to support trust 
and safety. 
This article is also situated in a growing scholarly literature on trust and 
the law. Although its focus was on how trust and law can affect 
technologically mediated social life, trust also plays important roles in our 
relationships to government, law enforcement, health care companies, 
landlords, employers, and more. This research agenda is, therefore, ripe for 
growth. 
In the end, no social spaces, online or offline, can always be safe. Life 
involves risk, and so do disclosures, social networking, online dating, and 
the conveniences of modern life. But privacy and safety remain relevant. 
Privacy, expectations of confidentiality and discretion, and relief from hate 
and harassment are all necessary for identity formation, intellectual 
freedom, and equality. As such, they are essential to a well-functioning 
democracy, increasingly under threat today. Design and law can play 
guiding and expressive roles in support of these goals. 
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